without their assistance, or their selfless service in the cause of our nation. May we, the soldiers of the 21st Century Army be worthy successors. 
PART1. RATIONALE AND METHODOLOGY
The United States Army has been "transforming" since the 14th of June 1775, when the Continental Congress established a standing force. The evolution of the Army, is constantnothing ever truly stands still. What are the components of "transformation?" It is not simply change -it is the creation of an entirely new force that is radically different upon multiple levels.
Organization, equipment, doctrine and capabilities must all become substantially different before a transformation has occurred. Additional turbulence created by unit moves, personnel replacement or rotation, and the nuances of unit leadership can all multiply the effects of transformation. Concentrated periods of simultaneous revisions in equipment, training, structure and doctrine occur only rarely in our Army's history. As new equipment arrives in units, as organizational structure and manning is radically changed, and as organizational culture itself is rent by fluctuations in personnel, the impacts of transformation are myriad. They are also potentially destructive, rather than constructive.
As the modern American Army struggles to "transform" itself for 21st Century warfare, we must remember that any force fielded by our nation is built by, with, and for the soldiers who compose it. Privates and sergeants and their junior officers must adapt to the challenges of major transformation and change, as well as senior officers. The US Army has acquisition cycles, Project Managers, System Managers, modeling facilities, and fielding teams that place new equipment and doctrine into the hands of our troops. How do the troops themselves handle all of this? How does a platoon sergeant convince his soldiers that constant changes in kit and organization are both necessary and good things? How does a young squad leader work through in his own mind that "transforming" will bring him and his soldiers back from war in both of those two all-important states: alive and victorious?
Although change is indeed a constant in the life of the individual soldier and his outfit, simultaneous changes or transformation in equipment, organization and manning is relatively infrequent. Thankfully, the instance of simultaneous transformation on multiple levels occurring concurrent with frequent unit moves and massive personnel turbulence is even more rare. The ability to accept, manage, rationalize and inculcate change in order to make the eventual outcome a victorious one in combat is a testament to the small unit leader.
At no time in the history of Americas Army has turbulence, change and transformation probably been more pervasive than in the rapid modernization, mobilization and expansion of the infantry formations of Americas World War II Armored Force. An examination of this extreme example of transformation through the eyes of the soldiers involved may be instructive for modern Army leaders as we transform our current force.
Between 1940 and 1945, the American Army formed and fielded sixteen Armored
Divisions that eventually fought in over fifty battles and campaigns in World War II. 2 Along the way, the infantry formations of these divisions transformed into a force utterly unlike their origins. The units selected for this study were originally formed as four regular, foot-borne infantry regiments armed with rifles, some machine guns, and a few trucks. By the end of the war, they had been transformed into a dozen self-contained and highly lethal separate battalions, equipped with armored personnel carriers, self-propelled anti-tank systems, a plethora of machine guns, and their own unique, mobile combat doctrine-largely self-taught.
Some of the units selected for this study underwent sixteen major change events: major and minor TOE changes; unit moves; massive personnel rotations and the eventual crucible of combat. This work is not intended to be a comprehensive history of the Armored Infantry, although one is long overdue. In order to focus the scope of this study, it is limited to the affected units of four Armored Divisions, the 4th, 5th, 6th and 7th. These outfits were selected because the infantry units of these divisions were originally formed between 15 April, 1941 and 1 March, 1942 3 as regular infantry and underwent each of the major subsequent transformations directed by the War Department and Armored Force Center, (currently the U.S. Army Armor School). Unlike the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Armored Divisions, these divisions underwent their first trial by fire in the evolved form of "light" armored divisions, with their infantry organized as separate battalions, (Table 1) . This study focuses upon the impacts of transformation in the Armored Infantry at battalion level and below. It examines the theory for changes as contained within official documentation, and the practice of transformation as experienced by the junior participants.
Particular attention is paid to critical leadership challenges, and the methods used to overcome them. This paper examines in part the impacts of transformation and change upon the morale and confidence of soldiers and units as they moved inexorably toward grappling with the most lethal force on the earth in 1944-the German Wehrmacht.
PART 2. ARMORED FORCE EVOLUTION
To understand the fabric within which the Armored Infantry Battalions (AlBs) evolved, a basic understanding of the evolution of the U.S. armored division in World War II is necessary.
Among the principal combatants of the war, the United States was particularly slow to adopt a coherent armored formation within its army. 15 Additionally, the use of anti-tank elements in the defense proved the vulnerability of light tanks. The division also proved cumbersome to command and control, utilizing the single Armored brigade as its principle fighting headquarters.
As a consequence, the divisions were reorganized in March 1942 with some significant changes. The armor Brigade was disbanded, and in its place, two "combat commands" were organized to enhance flexibility and reduce the span of control. The infantry regiment was increased from two battalions to three, and the ratio of medium tanks to light tanks was greatly increased to increase firepower and survivability at the expense of some speed of movement. Table 2 enumerates the changes between the two formations, but several key differences must be highlighted. 18 A principle behind the divisional restructuring was the philosophy of attachment and detachment. The combat formations of the armored division were reorganized to facilitate the ability to move self-contained, battalion sized force packages to and from diverse headquarters. 19 Significantly for the tank and infantry, this obviated the need for regimental headquarters. These were reorganized into three separate battalions, each complete with organic service companies for logistics, and larger headquarters elements for command, control and supporting arms. 20 Battalion commanders found their personal concerns now included logistics and supporting arms.
Not all armored divisions were reorganized into this 1943 light armored structure. Both the 2nd and 3rd Divisions remained organized under the March 1942 structure, with some partial reductions in ancillary services and equipment, (some of General McNair's "gadgets ...and extravagance"). America's remaining fourteen tank divisions were, however, affected by this major change. For those divisions that had already beeh called into service and were in the process of formation, these changes were significant. 
INFANTRY IN THE ARMORED DIVISIONS
The mission of the infantry arm of the division as envisioned in 1940 was to follow armored attacks, and to secure ground as it was overrun by tanks. At night and at halts, the infantry was expected to establish outposts, conduct local patrols and otherwise provide security for the tanks of the division. 21 The force was mounted in either wheeled scout cars, or rode in 2 1/2 ton trucks.
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The American theory of infantry operations within armored divisions was the child of diverse influences. Early reports of the successful operations of German Panzer divisions in Poland and France relegated the infantry formations to secondary roles in security, or perhaps even tertiary roles in less glamorous tasks such as guarding command posts and prisoners of war. 23 As reports of British operations in North Africa began to influence the Armor Center, the roles of infantrymen enlarged to include patrolling, mine clearing and flank security. During the summer and fall maneuvers of 1941, the opposing forces extensive use of anti-tank guns in wooded and complex terrain indicated a clear need for infantrymen in the offense, to clear villages and wooded terrain that could mask enemy anti-tank weapons.
emerged to increase the ratio of infantrymen to tanks, as well as to design a vehicle in which the infantry could move at the same speed as attacking tanks.
PART 3. ARMORED INFANTRY EXPANSION AND REORGANIZATION
As with nearly every other branch of the Army, the numerical expansion required of the States Army had no armored infantry formations prior to July 1940. These units were being conceptualized literally as they were physically created.
The original infantry formations organic to the armored divisions were regular, "leg" infantry regiments, with three major differences: they had only two battalions vice three, they lacked organic anti-tank systems, (the theory being that the divisions tanks would provide that capability in the rare instances of defense), and the infantry were allocated sufficient numbers of trucks and wheeled armored cars to allow the entire division to move mounted. 26 The redesignation of these formations to an Armored Infantry Regiment in the March, 1942 version of the armored division added a third maneuver battalion, upgraded all transport from trucks to armored cars, (which were generally still in short supply), and increased the number of support troops commensurate with the increase in vehicles. 27 The regimental headquarters was maintained for command and control. A major deficiency in this organization was the failure to increase the size of the rifle squads to incorporate the need for a vehicle crew-somebody had to drive, and someone else had to man the organic machine gun. The Commanding General of the 1st Armored Division felt that this oversight reduced his infantry strength by a battalion. 28 Significant change was wrought by the September 1943 "Light Tank Division" reorganization. The regimental headquarters was abolished in favor of three large battalion headquarters. As previously noted, the battalions added organic logistics and medical support, and the size of each squad was increased to accommodate the need for vehicle crews.
Significant upgrades in equipment to include new families of tracked vehicles, new anti-tank systems, and adding a plethora of machine guns increased unit organic firepower fivefold.
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Although there were six subsequent changes to the basic document, the Some half-track operators were assigned simply because they, "could figure out where the starter was." 34 Soldiers arriving as combat replacements were often a prized commodity because they had some familiarity with fielded weapons such as the bazooka or land mines while in basic training. These weapons were sometimes unused by outfits in combat because the troops were simply issued the items without any training. 35 Not all combat replacements were so technically fortunate. CPL Michael Mastrianni had never seen a .30 caliber watercooled machine gun before he was assigned as the gunner of one in combat with the 15th AIB.
DOCTRINE
The "doctrine" of armored-infantry operations in the American Army was virtually nonexistent. There were many theories and the evolution of Tactics, Techniques and Procedures, (TTPs) was a product of experimentation from the squad level up to division commanders. A formal doctrine for the Armored Infantry Battalion was not published by the War Department until November 1944, and it's sister publication for the Armored Infantry Company the same month. Although useful and reasonably complete for operating at their respective echelons, these manuals did not make their appearance in time to be of measurable use to units in combat. 37 The very existence of these documents was in fact a revelation to many of the veterans interviewed for this study. infantrymen in the 4th didn't even know which tank battalion they were operating with from battle to battle.
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Basic combat tactics, such as when tanks led attacks and when the infantry led them were often bloody lessons learned on the field of battle. 43 Even the utilization of core equipment such as the half-track was often a matter of personality, sometimes down to the platoon level. Some units discounted the vehicle as simply a means of moving infantrymen to the battlefield 44 , while others placed a heavy premium upon the additional firepower provided by the vehicles organic machine guns. 45 A 9th AIB veteran provides an excellent description of one unit's SOPs, "As we approached...from behind a hill, some of our tanks took up positions on the rear slope and began firing into the town. First one tank, then another, would crawl up to a point where the gun would clear the hilltop. Fire at a target, back out of sight and another tank, a little farther down the line, would roll up and do the same thing. On and on until the CO thought the town was softened up enough. When the tanks stopped firing, we, the armored infantry, left our halftracks behind the hill and went toward the town in spread out formation. As we crossed a sugar beet field, we came upon an underground bunker which was flush with the surface and so well camouflaged, I almost fell into the narrow entrance. A few Germans were inside. A sergeant tried to get them to surrender, but they refused. We then fired into the bunker, then entered to make sure of no further resistance...At one building, my squad leader...asked for a volunteer to go into the building with him. He and I entered the building through a large hole our tanks had blown in it. We found no Germans there, but as we came out, the roof was engulfed with flames." strength. 57 The patience and organizational skill necessary for the cadre to form up squads, platoons and companies, or even to house this overwhelming mass of men would have stunned lesser men into insensibility.
The timing of major injections of key personnel was poor. The 9th AIB of the 6th
Armored Division received fifteen NCOs from a disbanding AIB (the 535th) sixty days prior to the 9th's departure overseas. 58 The 5th Armored Division received over 250 NCOs from the 181st Infantry Regiment, (a "leg" outfit), three weeks before leaving for England. 59 The impact upon small unit cohesion, as well as the confidence levels of these newly arrived and anointed armored infantrymen were staggering. During this same period, the company was commanded by seven different officers, one of whom was killed, two wounded and another evacuated due to illness. Combat losses will occur, perhaps not on the scale of the AlBs, but losses will have to be made good by our replacement system. A corollary of the AIB experience is however, possible in peacetime. Soldiers will be assigned to units that are already transforming. As with the AIB combat replacements, they'll be joining something new and foreign to their experience, and both they and their new comrades will face uncertainty as soldiers try to "catch up" to the needs of the outfit. Indoctrination programs are crucial to ensure the smooth integration of new soldiers into existing units without disruption of effectiveness or esprit and cohesion. This is not a sponsorship program-it is a regimen of technical "jumpstarting" designed to reduce the potential for short term deterioration in unit and soldier skills and confidence.
LEADING:
The AlBs integrated the complicating factors of combined arms at platoon level, in the form of tanks, infantry, a machine gun squad and a mortar squad. This required leaders who could fight, coordinate, synchronize and survive simultaneously. The training base of the army was inadequate to the needs of these men and their units, and the results were too-often fatal, both to their leaders and to their men. Technical expertise often carried an officer through his initial days, but the tactical shortcomings of training were glaring.
As doctrine and equipment are fielded for transforming forces, the educational and leadership needs of the lieutenants and sergeants of the force must be at the forefront. Close synchronization has to be maintained between the curriculums of NCO schools, precommissioning, officer basic, and captain career courses with doctrinal and equipment evolutions due to transformation This will become more difficult as the complicating factors of 21st Century technology make the tendency for over-specialization great. The reach of information technology will probably consolidate more decision-making at the battalion level and higher. However, the soldier on the ground in the center of battle has to be absolutely certain that his squad leaders, platoon leaders and company commanders know their business.
What goes on at battalion and brigade level will probably be as immaterial to the 21st Century soldiers as it was to his World War II forebear.
The rationale for dramatic changes in the AlBs, indeed, their very formation from the regimental structure, provides an interesting final insight. Multiple official sources and scholarly works agree with confidence and documentation that the "heavy" tank division transformed into the "light" one of 1943 due to Army-wide manpower needs and lessons derived from the British and Germans. 67 However, every veteran interviewed for this study emphatically stated that these changes were due to the outcome of American experiences in the North African Campaign, and in particular to the dismal performance of the 1st Armored Division at the Battle of Kasserine Pass. 68 These men were, and remain convinced that their leaders from flag officers to squad leaders were directing and executing change in order to avoid repeating the mistakes of Kasserine Pass. Unit leadership within the armored divisions seized upon the anecdotal evidence of an American battle as the catalyst for change. For the modern Army, the rationale for change must be articulated to, and understood and accepted by the participants down to the individual soldier. Transformation must have a purpose, and that purpose has to be understood and internalized by the soldiers who fight and die in our nations wars.
PART 6. CONCLUSIONS
The transformation of the United States Army of the 21st Century is enabled by technology, but it cannot be techno-centric. The human imperatives in force transformation must be at the forefront of our approach. We must heed the lessons learned by those soldiers who have done all of this before, in the Armored Infantry Battalions of World War II and elsewhere. The transformation of the Armored Infantry in World War II can be typified as a confusing maelstrom of soldiers and personnel arriving and departing to and from units, training being executed immediately prior to structural reorganization and the fielding of new equipment immediately prior to, or even during, it's use in combat. It is a tribute to the flexibility, endurance and dedication of the American soldier that all of this somehow worked, and America won.
Man is the center of Army transformation. America's soldiers must know why they are changing, how they are changing, and that these changes are good for them and good for our nation. The soldier and his junior leader still stand at the center of the Army's ability to fight and win it's nations wars-and to do anything else our nation requires of it.
Word Count: 6,905 NET: New Equipment Training. The process by which the users of new equipment learn it's operation, functions and capabilities. There are two major forms of NET: direct user, (everyone learns), and Train the Trainer, (leaders and specialized instructors learn, and then perform direct user training themselves). 
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